Introduction
Pfaff recommended a re-colonisation of the sub-region by former metropolitan powers as a way of stabilising it. 7 The extent of human insecurity and its effects on sub-regional economic developments has necessitated the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in attempting to resolve these conflicts. Consequently, though originally crafted as an economic integration scheme, ECOWAS was transformed from an economic into a political-security organisation, in response to the worsening instability enabling ECOWAS to intervene in West African crisis situations.
In the pursuit of peace and the stabilisation of the sub-region, many attempts to understand the underlying social, economic, cultural and political factors for the conflicts and their ensuing dynamics have been made. Yet, very little scholarly research has attempted to test the argument that a combination of demography, particularly population composition and migration, and environmental factors have had critical impacts on the sub-region's conflict dynamics and should be critical variables in any analysis for designing future policy options. A review of scholarly work on conflict analysis in West Africa reveals an abysmal void in the establishment of the link between these important variables and the preponderance of conflicts or violence in the sub-region. In many instances such linkages are left to conjectures without substantial empirical arguments. This apparent lack of analytical input, we argue, has contributed to undermining both sub-regional and international endeavours to formulate holistic and sustainable intervention strategies that comprehensively engage the underlying causes of the conflicts in West Africa.
Rather than leave such linkages to conjectures and refutations, in this paper, we attempt to understand the complex and multiple inter-linkages between population composition, especially age distribution; environment and their associated dynamics that accompany the outbreak of conflicts in West Africa by using Liberia, Sierra Leone and La Cote d'Ivoire as empirical case studies. The choice of these cases is informed by their conflict dynamics reflected in the regionwide spill-over effects, multiplicity of actors, protraction and fluidity, which are the hallmarks of many other African crisis situations.
In this paper, we argue that West Africa's conflict experiences since 1990 have never been devoid of the concurrent influence of the youth bulge problematic and the effects of the economic downturns of countries in the sub-region. These factors can therefore not be relegated to the background in present and future attempts to achieve peace. We also argue that the outbreak of conflicts has had grave ramifications on the region's environmental security. In tandem with such developments, however, environmental changes are also playing an important role in fomenting tensions in many forest and Sahelian areas. In this context, desertification in West Africa is an early warning indicator that, given increasing population growth and the pressure on natural resources, tensions in the forest communities of West Africa between migrants and indigenes over access to arable lands, water resources and pasture might increase. This paper starts with a section that analyses the nexus between demography and conflict from which evidence is deduced to explain the youth bulge phenomenon and supporting destabilising factors. Subsequently, we discuss migratory flows and conflict in terms of the role of migration and its impact in fuelling tensions and the cyclical impact of conflict on migration trends. The third section assesses the possible role of environmental challenges in fomenting tensions and the effects conflicts have on the environment. The paper concludes with possible policy options for West Africa.
Demography and Conflict: The Population Composition Nexus
Demography concerns the entire social characteristics of a population and their development through time. These include, inter alia, analysis of a population on the basis of age, sex, ethnicity, occupation, changes in population, and migration. In assessing the nexus between demography and conflict, therefore, several important deductive pairings can be made given the many characteristics of demography. However, in this section we focus primarily on the population composition nexus and migration for the purposes of distilling policy-relevant conclusions.
Sex and age distribution ratios are two characteristics that are key to population composition considerations in relation to conflict analysis. Proponents of sex distribution ratio as a factor in conflict analysis argue that the greater the imbalances in a population in favour of men, the higher the likelihood of instability and conflict. 8 On the other hand, the age distribution ratio contenders argue that there is a nexus between a higher proportion of young adults as a ratio of total adult population and the likely outbreak and sustenance of conflict. 9 With the active involvement of young people in African conflicts and the consequent emergence and role childsoldiers play an analysis with respect to age distribution is useful as it provides an explanatory framework to understanding the underlying dynamics surrounding both their recruitment and usage for facts-based policy options.
The transformation of a population from one characterized by short lives and large families to one with long lives and small families is referred to as demographic transition. Demographic transitions occur in five basic phases: the pre-transition phase, early-transition, middle-transition, late-transition, and post-transition phases. 10 A country's progress through these phases is linked to the birth and death rates of its population. All countries, therefore, belong to one of the phases.
Countries in early demographic transitions are characterised by a decline in childhood death rates while birth rates remain high. This notably results in rapid population growth, unusually large
proportions of children and adolescent dependents, and a relative dearth of working age adults per dependent.
Between 1970 and 2000, countries that were in the late phase of demographic transition characterised by lower birth-rates and higher life expectancy had an evenly distributed age group ratios and were less prone to the outbreak of civil conflicts. As overall birth and death rates declined, however, the risk of conflict outbreak decreased. 11 Conversely, countries in medium demographic transitions characterised by higher birth rates and lower life expectancies resulted in high youth population as a proportion of total adult population and became more predisposed to the outbreak and sustenance of conflicts. Consequently, in the 1990s, the demographic factors that were most closely associated with the likelihood of civil conflict were a high proportion of young adults (aged 15 to 29 years), and rapid urban population growth rate.
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Countries where young adults comprised more than 40 per cent of the adult population were more than twice likely to experience the outbreak of civil conflict than those with lower young adult population. 13 Also, countries with urban population growth rates above 4.0 per cent were about twice as likely to sustain the outbreak of a civil conflict. 14 Whereas the Liberia, Sierra 
Adducing evidence from West Africa
In sub-Saharan Africa, a juxtaposition of the above realities with unstable countries from the early 1970s reveals that many countries have had to grapple with mutually reinforcing destabilizing situations of: (i) economic down-turns; (ii) population changes; and (iii) social tensions resulting from resource scarcity.
In the early 1970s, the global economy experienced a downturn due to the collapse of the Bretton Whilst the sub-region generally grappled with difficult economic factors, the population growth rate not only grew (see figure 1 ), but also increasingly changed in composition. Indeed, these reflections lend credence to the high young adult determinist argument of the causes of conflict. From such a view point, we argue that the phenomenon has significantly contributed to the past and present security uncertainties of the West African sub-region.
Nuancing the Youth Bulge Argument: The Ghana Case
Whereas siding with the youth bulge determinist school of thought will cause one to admit that this phenomenon may have enormously contributed to the periodicity and sustenance of the conflicts in West Africa, it is also important to nuance the argument with certain key 36 . Ibid. comparisons in the region. Particularly, it is essential to reflect on why certain countries in the sub-region with an equally high young adult population have steered clear of civil conflicts. We attempt to provide an analysis of the important mitigating factors that explain why some countries slipped into instability under situations of high young adult populations whilst others did not by using Ghana as a case study.
Ghana's young adult population has since the 1970s comprised an important fraction of the country's total population (see table 1 ). This provided Jerry Rawlings the initial support for his revolutionary actions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Subsequently, majority of them were incorporated into his the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR). The committees provided many young adults the opportunity to challenge the status quo, particularly traditional power arrangements and urban bureaucracies and to, generally, feel part of the revolutionary process at the time.
This counterfactual argument brings into sharp critique any attempt to employ the youth bulge phenomenon as a mono-causal and simplistic yard-stick to explain West Africa's past and present security uncertainties. It highlights the fact that whereas explaining the underlying causes of conflicts using a single conceptualisation could be persuasive, it could also be catastrophic.
An extensive analysis of any conflict situation should, therefore, be considered on the basis of multiple causes taking into particular consideration the peculiarities of any given situation.
Against this background, in addition to the youth bulge phenomenon, other factors such as specific local dynamics and responses to prevailing local conditions are important in understanding the effects of the youth bulge phenomenon in West Africa. Even though Ghana has a high young adult population, similar to other countries in the sub-region, its response to the economic and political marginalisation of the young adult component of its population differed.
Therefore, whereas the high young adult population argument holds true for some of the conflicts, Ghana's example suggests that it is not necessarily always the case. We argue that leadership, mobilisation and ill-exploitation of the massive youth energies by inept and selfish power-seeking political entities and personalities, indispensable factors that contribute to the explosive role of the youth bulge problematic in West African conflicts.
Migration Patterns and Conflicts: A Cause or the Curse?
West Africa is one region of Sub-Saharan Africa that is highly noted for intense human mobility.
Traditionally, the patterns of intra-West Africa migration have been rooted in the economic performance and the availability of economic opportunities for migrant populations in the recipient countries. Throughout the sub-region's history, expulsion and deportation policies against migrants in the event of any economic down-turn have been notable. deaths and the displacement of more than 10,000 people. 48 In these two instances, the principal cause of the confrontations has been traced to the struggle over land and accusations that migrants are degrading the forests by burning them to commence farming activities.
As is evident in figure 1 , the average annual percentage increases to total West Africa population, started decreasing glaringly from the early 1990s. Whilst so many factors can be attributed to this decrease, it is equally important to realize that the West African civil wars were high about the same period. Our argument against this backdrop is that the intense casualty levels of the conflicts in West Africa significantly affected population growth rates by significantly increasing the morbidity and mortality ratios in the conflict-ridden countries. In Liberia, years of civil war contributed to high unemployment, illiteracy, and increasing HIV/AIDS infection rates resulting from internal displacement and migration. The infant mortality rate rose to about 137 deaths per 1000 live births, and maternal mortality ratio increased to about 760 deaths per 100,000 live births. 49 Life expectancy dropped from 45.9 years to 40.5 years between 1985-90 and 1990-95 respectively. 50 In Sierra Leone, it reduced to 38.4
years from a previous of 39.5 during the same period. With the exception of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all the remaining countries in West Africa increased their life expectancy levels. The sub-regional total fertility rate (children per woman) also decreased from 6.86 to 6.59. 51 Whereas conflict cannot be wholly blamed for this reduction, the fact that all the then conflict-ridden countries registered a reduction in life expectancy establishes the impact West African conflicts have had on the population growth patterns of the sub-region.
The Environment: A Cause or a Victim?
According to Arthur H. Westing et al, the relevance of environmental issues in fomenting disputes leading to armed conflicts include: (i) disputes over access to renewable resources; (ii) disease burdens that overwhelm communities' ability to cope and that tear apart fragile social fabrics; (iii) the repercussions of migrant populations; and (iv) the unequal nature of adverse impacts and burdens. 52 In West Africa, however, accessibility to renewable resources and the repercussions of the flow of "environmental refugees" are an important way by which the environment is greatly relevant to armed conflict. Whilst the former has been noted in almost all the major conflicts in West Africa and the ongoing Niger Delta crisis, the latter is rarely 49 . However, there is room for concern in the future given worsening environmental conditions. As desertification as moderately degraded lands will become severely degraded and intensify pressure on farm lands. The increase in pressure on arable lands will directly add to the growing environmental strains and surge tensions in the forest areas of the sub-region between migrant farmers and pastoralists who may move further down into the forest belt from the Sahel.
Currently, rivers in West Africa discharge more than 40% less than they discharged in the 1970s. 57 This implies that rivers in the sub-region could provide less water in the future than they are currently. With increasing sub-regional population growth and demand for water, it is fairly predictable that the region will run into a water crisis if environmental conditions worsen or even remain as they are presently. Within areas where situations will worsen, the likelihood of tensions developing over access to water is high. The Niger and Volta basins could then become possible flashpoints for inter-state tensions due to the fact that rivers in these basins are shared by several countries. The Niger River, for instance, currently provides water for about 10 countries;
if it loses water and begins to run dry, critical security issues could emerge around the extent to which individual countries in the basin can draw on the available water so as not to run the river completely dry or deprive other dependent states. If inter-dependency and inter-state collaboration strategies in the management of the water do not emerge in such a situation, the likelihood of water-related inter-state tensions can be predicted.
In Ghana, the Volta River which provides the country's primary source of electricity has its source in Burkina Faso. Between December 2006 and September 2007, a drop in the water level in the Akosombo Dam due to reduced water level in the Volta River had multiple economic and political implications as the country had to ration electricity. The extent of politicisation of the issue was so pervasive that the ruling party's governance capability was questioned by many political analysts. Yet, many traced the worsening drop of water in the dam partly to Burkina Faso's decision to construct a dam on the Bagri River which is the source of the Volta River in Ghana. 58 In a realist situation of state-centricism, this is a classical avenue for inter-state tension between the two countries if similar crises continue to occur downstream as a result of the activities of countries up-stream. Such crises could lead to inter-state tensions as water (rivers)
would then become an inter-state security issue.
A panacea within such a situation would then be the extent of inter-dependence and inter-state collaboration in managing trans-boundary waters resources. Currently, there is no strategic subregional approach to avert such an occurrence between states. For years, both Ghana and Burkina Faso, despite the importance of the Volta River to both countries, had not consciously mapped out any strategy for mutual use until recent times when a joint committee for both countries on the management of the Volta Lake was initiated.
Whilst contributing to disputes in the sub-region, the outbreak of conflict in West Africa has had critical impact on the environment. These include: (i) the use of high explosive munitions; (ii) use of heavy equipment particularly tanks and other off-road vehicles; (iii) pitching of bases and camps; (iv) over-exploitation of the environment for shelter, food and economic purposes by insurgents; (v) Bush-burning as an insurgency strategy; among others. Whereas these stated points have direct adverse impacts on the environment, the breakdown of law and order due to civil war usually leaves protected areas and species vulnerable to over-exploitation by communities and warring factions. In Sierra Leone, forest protection officers such as foresters, rangers and guards were not paid for a long period during the civil war. This gave the leeway for illegal mining activities, logging and other forms of massive deforestation of the country's forest cover.
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The Liberian civil war also gave room for poaching of wild animals of the country's wildlife for food and illegal logging. The breakdown of law and order subsequently led to marine pollution resulting from damaged and abandoned ships at the coastal sites. Urban waste collection arrangements were badly strained leading to hoards of uncollected urban waste with their accompanying environmental effects. 59 . 
Conclusion
In West Africa, the prevalence and devastation of human life by HIV/AIDS pandemic will critically have an influence on the youth composition of many populations and affect security adversely. Increase in AIDS-related deaths will reduce the adult population and increase the proportion of an already large young adult population. The trend will then have the capacity of creating a large population of under-educated and under-supervised young people who may have adverse effects on security of states.
Even though factors underlying conflicts are multi-causal and should be considered as such, it is high time realistic conflict prevention policy initiatives began to disaggregate the multiplicity of underlining factors so as to properly pre-empt policy orientation. We have argued that the youth bulge phenomenon, migration and environmental degradation are important perspectives from which security concerns in the sub-region should be confronted. Whilst admitting that the factors do not act alone to underlie the conflict situations in West Africa, it will be regrettable to discount these factors as mere coincidental conceptualisations and deductions that should be relegated to the background in the quest for peace. Together with the various underlying economic, social, political and structural factors in many countries, we have argued that some countries in the sub-region have fallen victim to the effects of a higher young adult population, and the complexities that ensue as the situation becomes concurrent with inadequacy/inequitable distribution of resources, and unpredictable domestic economic and political environment.
Similarly, tensions surrounding the activities of environmental refugees' especially migrant farmers and pastoralists in the forest belt highlight the critical role of the environment in the security of West Africa.
It is, therefore, important that in addition to the many peace initiatives in West Africa, the following policy options are given vital consideration:
 Factors and processes that have the capacity of impacting on the demographic composition of states and further contribute to a skewed demographic composition in favour of young adults must be confronted with utmost urgency in the sub-region. This is because such factors have the capacity to worsen the demographic composition of states creating a youth bulge and its associated complexities. An important factor in this regard is the HIV/AIDS pandemic which has the capacity to distort sub-regional demography by increasing the proportion of the already large young adult population through reduction in life expectancy.
The fight against HIV/AIDS could therefore be securitised both nationally and subregionally. This will positively affect the commitment of states in terms of resource allocation and political will to implement formulated policies.
 Policies that target young adults should be consciously crafted so as not to create discomfort and dissatisfaction that make young people vulnerable to political manipulation by desperate individuals who may want to exploit their desperate situations to foment unrests. In this direction efforts should be made to answer (address?) the chronic unemployment and the generally uncertain future that lies ahead of young adults.
Youth development programmes should be made inseparable parts of DDR processes so as to sustain peace and also prevent youth-led implosion and re-ignition of conflicts.
Specific intervention efforts should target training and job creation, and entrepreneurship promotion among young people.
 Environmental protection policies should be an important part of national and subregional security strategies. Presently, ECOWAS does not have an environmental policy for member states. Even though it is being drafted at the time of writing this paper, the document does not clearly outline sub-regional strategies for managing trans-boundary resources such as water. ECOWAS, through an environmental policy document, should clearly establish guidelines for inter-state collaboration in the usage of trans-boundary resources as a proactive way of preventing resource-based inter-state tensions in West Africa. Countries that share a particular environment-dependent resource (such as water in the case of Ghana and Burkina) should be encouraged to collaboratively craft mechanisms for their peaceful use.
